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RECENT CASES
Alimony-Modification of Lump Sum Settlements-[New Jersey].-In 1918 a
divorce decree nisi was entered between the parties which awarded the wife temporary
alimony at the rate of $50.00 per month. This decree was modified by a decree of gig
which, stating by way of recital that the parties had reached an agreement as to the
payment of a lump sum in lieu of alimony, ordered the deletion from the original
decree nisi of the provision for alimony. In 1920, the decree nisi was made final.
Seventeen years later the wife petitioned to amend the decree so as to include a pro-
vision for alimony. Held, for petitioner as a matter of discretion but not of right.
Parnly v. Parmly.'
This decision is contrary to the prevailing rule regarding the power of courts to
modify lump sum settlements, but may be justified under a New Jersey statute
which provides, in effect, that the court of chancery may entertain a petition for ali-
mony subsequent to a divorce decree.3
Where the parties agree to a lump sum settlement in lieu of alimony,4 two situa-
tions must be distinguished regarding modification by the court after the decree has
been rendered.5 First, if the agreement was incorporated into the decree, there is some
authority6 that the court retains jurisdiction to modify it under a widely adopted
provision in divorce statutes authorizing courts to modify alimony allowances at any
X i A. (2d) 646 (N.J. 1938).
2 N.J. Rev. Stat. 1937, § 2:50-37. See note i6 infra.
3 "Pending a suit for divorce, or after decree of divorce, the court of Chancery may make
such order touching the alimony of the wife .... as the circumstances of the case shall render
fit, reasonable and just." Even in the absence of such an agreement, the court may order the
payment of alimony in one lump sum where there is a statute to that effect.
4 Thirteen states have such statutes authorizing alimony in gross: Ariz. Rev. Code 1933,
§ 3-1218; Del. Rev. Code 1935, § 3512; Ind. Burns, Ann. Stat. 1933, § 3-1218; Kan. Gen.
Stat. 1935, § 60 (15ii); Me. Rev. Stat. 1930, c. 73, § 9; Mich. Comp. L. 1929, § 12745;
Mo. Rev. Stat. 1929, H8 1355, 1356; N.H. Pub. L. 1926, c. 287, § i6; N.M. Stat. Ann. 1929,
§ 68 (5o6); Ohio, Page Ann. Gen. Code 1936, §§ 11990, 1i99i, 11992, i1993; Okla. Comp. Stat.
1931, § 672; Ore. Code 1930, § 6 (914); Vt. Pub. L. 1933, § 3155. In other jurisdictions the
power to make such an award has been implied from the general statutes requiring mainte-
nance of the wife. Calame v. Calame, 25 N.J. Eq. 548 (1874); Sobelv. Sobel, 99 N.J. Eq. 376,
132 At. 603 (1926); Reed v. Reed, 121 Ohio St. 188, 167 N.E. 684 (1929); Plaster v. Plaster,
47 Ill. 290 (i868).
$In the absence of statute, a court ordinarily loses jurisdiction to modify a judgment or
decree after expiration of the term at which the judgment or decree was entered. 1 Black,
Judgments § 154.(1902).
6 Kunker v. Kunker, 23o App. Div. 641, 246 N.Y. Supp. 118 (1930); Herrick v. Herrick,
319 IIL. 146, i49 N.E. 820 (1925); Skinner v. Skinner, 205 Mich. 243, 171 N.W. 383 (1919);
Warren v. Warren, 1i6 Minn. 458, 133 N.W. ioog (i9II); see also note 44 Harv. L. Rev. 127
(i93i). It is to be noted that in these cases the decree awarded alimony payments as well as
a lump sum settlement and that the modification went only to the alimony payments. But
see Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 87 Adt. io33 (1913).
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time,? but in most jurisdictions this provision has not been so interpreted.8 Second,
if the agreement is not made part of the decree, the decisions agree (except in New
Jersey) in holding that the court lacks jurisdiction to modify,9 possibly upon the
theory that the matter has been taken out of the hands of the court by the private
agreemento
According to the majority view, in both situations the wife precludes herself by
an out-of-court agreement from invoking the aid of the court to obtain maintenance
from her former husband."1
In the instant case it is evident that even in New Jersey12 the petitioner has waived
her right to claim from her former husband maintenance, i.e., support according to
the standard to which she was accustomed. The controversial point, however, is
whether by such agreement she waives her right to a claim against him for bare sus-
tenance when she is about to become a public charge. In effect, the litigation in the in-
stant case is between the State and the former husband as to who shall be visited
with the burden of the petitioner's sustenance. The New Jersey court apparently
felt that despite the waiver by the agreement, which completely ended the marital
status, the respondent continued to owe to the State an obligation to prevent the peti-
tioner from becoming a burden upon the taxpayers.
In some jurisdictions it was held that a divorce decree in a case where there is
service by publication13 and into which an alimony provision cannot be incorporated'4
7 The prevailing rule is that the court cannot alter the decree unless power to do so was
reserved therein, or unless there is a general statutory authority. Thirty-one American
jurisdictions have such a statute. See Vernier, American Family Law § io6 (1932).
8 Plaster v. Plaster, 47 Ill. 290 (1868); Clough v. Long, 8 Ohio App. 420 (19i8); Henderson
v. Henderson, 37 Ore. 141, 6o Pac. 577 (igoo); Wallace v. Wallace 74 N.H. 256, 67 At. 58o
(1907); Erwin v. Erwin, 179 Ark. 192, 14 S.W. (2d) 11oo (1929); Marshall v. Marshall,
236 S.W. 378 (Mo. 1922); Beard v. Beard, 57 Neb. 754, 78 N.W. 255 (1899); Kraft v. Kraft,
x93 Iowa 602, 187 N.W. 449 (X922); Booth v. Booth, 114 Kan. 377, 219 Pac. 513 (1923).
9 Smith v. Johnson, 321 Ill. 134, 15i N.E. 550 (1926); Kunker v. Kunker, 23o App. Div.
641, 246 N.Y. Supp. 18 (193o); Johnson v. Johnson, 206 N.Y. 56i, ioo N.E. 408 (1912);
Brown v. Brown, 132 Ga. 712, 64 S.E. 1092 (1909); Biery v. Steckel, 194 Pa. St. 445,45 At.
376 (I9OO). See Lindey, Separation Agreements 234 (1937).
10 Kunker v. Kunker, 23o App. Div. 641, 246 N.Y. Supp. i8 (93o) and cases cited therein.
See note 9 supra.
Ix Plaster v. Plaster, 47 Ill. 290 (i868); Wallace v. Wallace, 74 N.H. 256, 67 At. 58o (19o7);
Brown v. Brown, 132 Ga. 712, 64 S.E. 1092 (igog); Guess v. Smith, ioo Miss. 457, 56 So. 166
(1914).
12 Greenberg v. Greenberg, 99 N.J. Eq. 461, 133 At. 768 (1928); Sobel v. Sobel, 99 N.J.
Eq. 376, 132 At. 603 (1926); Irwin v. Irwin, 98 N.J. Eq. 454, 131 Atl. 304 (1925).
13 A divorce decree which is in the nature of an in remn decree, may be entered by a court on
constructive service without acquiring actual personal jurisdiction of a non-resident defendant
Woodcock v. Woodcock, i69 Md. 40, 179 At. 826 (935); Cook v. Cook, 56 Wis. X95, 14 N.W.
33, 443 (1882); 2 Black, Judgments §§ 925, 933 (1902).
14 It is generally held that the question of alimony must be litigated in a divorce proceeding
and that a decree silent on alimony is resjudicata on that question. Kelley v. Kelley, 317 Ill.
104, 147 N.E. 659 (1925); Spain v. Spain, 177 Iowa 249, 158 N.W. 529 (1916); McFarlane v.
McFarlane, 43 Ore. 477, 73 Pac. 203 (19o3); Mouross v. Monross, 129 Mich. 27, 87 N.W. 1035
(igoi); Bassett v. Bassett, 99 Wis. 344, 74 N.W. 780 (1898); Howell v. Howell, 1o4 Cal. 45,
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is res judicata on the alimony question. The New Jersey statute was probably
designed to prevent such a ruling in that jurisdiction.16 The court avoided the contem-
plated effect of the lump sum settlement by extending the application of the statute
to the instant case. Other jurisdictions have adopted the opposite view.7 In the ab-
sence of statute, these courts place the burden upon the taxpayers upon the theory
that because of the lump sum settlement the wife has no more claim on her former
husband for this minimum support than she has on any other man in the community.'8
Attorney and Client-Reasonable Fee-Factors To Be Considered-[Wisconsin].-
An attorney, having successfully defended his client in a $48,000 tax suit brought by
the federalgovernment, sought to recover $16,025.o6 in fees on the basis of an oral con-
tingent fee contract. The client, admitting an oral contract, denied any provision
therein for a contingent fee, claiming that the contract was for reasonable value only.
The jury returned a verdict of $14,422.57 for the attorney. On appeal, held, reversed.
The evidence being insufficient to support a contingent fee contract, the attorney is
entitled only to the reasonable value of his services. The jury's verdict, amounting to
$641 a day for 28 days' services, is excessive. The maximum reasonable fee is $5o a
day for office work, $ioo a day for work requiring absence from the office. Podell v.
Gronik.'
Although in England, barristers cannot enforce payment for their services, 2 the
opposite rule is well established in the United States as regards attorneys.3 In com-
puting the amount of compensation to which an attorney is entitled, resort must often
be had to the rather indefinite standard of "reasonable value." The most frequently
occurring situations in which this standard is applied are where legal services are
rendered to a client with no definite fee stipulated4 where the contract of employment
37 Pac. 770 (1894). However, since an alimony provision has, an in personam; operation, such
provision may not properly be incorporated into an ex parte divorce decree where the de-
fendant has only had constructive service. Proctor v. Proctor, 215 11. 275, 74 N.E. 145 (I905);
Rigney v. Rigney, 127 N.Y. 408, 28 N.E. 4o5 (1891); 2 Black, Judgments §§ 925, 933 (1902).
IS That it is resjudicata: Kelley v. Kelley, 317 Ill. 104, 147 N.E. 659 (1925); Doeksen v.
Doeksen, 202 Iowa 489, 21o N.W. 545 (1926); Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U.S. .55 ('913);
Joyner v. Joyner, 131 Ga. 217, 62 S.E. 182 (i9o8); McFarlane v. McFarlane, 43 Ore. 477, 73
Pac. 203 (i9o3); Howell v. Howell, io4 Cal. 45, 37 Pac. 770 (1894). But see Hutton v. Dodge,
58 Utah 228, ig8 Pac. z65 (1921); COx v. Cox, 19 Ohio St. 502 (1869). Also see note io Minn.
L. Rev. 254 (1928) and 4 Wis. L. Rev. 226 (1927).
x6 Other jurisdictions having similar statutes are Massachusetts (Mass. G. L. 1932, c. 208,
§ 34) and Rhode Island. (R.I. G.L. 1923, § 4216).
17 Note 8 supra. 19 See Plaster v. Plaster, 47 Ill. 290, 294 (z868).
'282 N.W. 53 (Wis. 1938).
2Kennedy v. Brown, 13 C.B. (N.S.) 677 (1863); Turner v. Phillips, i Pea. 166 (1792);
Mowat v. Brown, ig Fed. 87 (C.C. Minn. x884).
Crozier v. Freeman Coal Min. Co., 363 Il]. 362, 2 N.E. (2d) 293 (1936); It re Pitman's
Guardianship, 120 Okla. gg, 250 Pac. zoiS (1926); Taft v. Thomajan, 249 Mass. 299, 144
N.E. 228 (1924).
4 Kline v. Blackwell, 63 F. (2d) 897 (C.C.A. Sth 1933), certiorari den. 29o U.S. 636 (I933);
Page v. Avila, .55 R.I. 52, 177 Ati. 541 (I935); Elconin v. Yalen, 208 Cal. 546, 282 Pac. 791
(X929); F. L. Stitt & Co. v. Powell, 94 Fla. 55o, 114 So. 375 (1927).
